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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gilbert Alexander Gonzales, Jr., appeals from his judgment and sentence entered upon his
conditional guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine and introducing or attempting to
introduce major contraband (methamphetamine) into a correctional facility.

Specifically,

Gonzales challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The district court set forth the relevant facts, intertwined with several credibility
determinations, in its oral decision during the hearing on Gonzales’s motion to suppress as follows:
The facts that the Court heard are that Officer Scholten of the Coeur d’Alene
Police Department . . . was patrolling in the parking lot that is shared between the
businesses of Shari’s restaurant and La Quinta Motel. The officer . . . testified it
was about 1:45 or 1:50 in the morning. And Mr. Gonzales [sic] it was about 1:15.
But the evidence is that the officer saw a black Chevy Blazer parked in what the
officer called a very darkened part of the parking lot.
He ultimately recognized that Blazer as belonging to a woman named
Arielle Padel, and also recognized Arielle Padel as a person who got out of that
vehicle. The Court makes that specific finding in that the evidence before the Court
here is not that the vehicle was parked at La Quinta, nor was it parked at Shari’s.
And the Court is going to make a reasonable inference that businesses open in the
nighttime are well lit at the entrances to those businesses. And so one would think
that one would park either at Shari’s or La Quinta and – rather than in the dark part
of a parking lot between those two if they were actually going to utilize those
businesses. But that’s just a factor that the Court is considering among others.
When Officer Scholten recognized Arielle Padel, he also recognized that
she was what we might call these days a person of interest in having maybe been
involved in an investigation within a recent period, one to two months, of a theft
involving firearms, or theft of a vehicle. And he recognized her as a person that
had been involved or was continuing to be involved in those investigations, or had
some involvements in those events. And so based on that, Officer Scholten tried to
contact Miss Padel and ask her essentially what was going on that particular night.
That would have been I think a consensual contact had she submitted to it, but she
did not. She just walked away and was not interested in stopping and talking to the
peace officer. He let her go and then went to the car and shined his flashlight into
1

this black Chevy Blazer. And his testimony was that he saw Mr. Gonzales lying
on the floor, head, side, feet on the floor.[1]
....
The Court is placing more weight on the testimony of Officer Scholten than
it’s placing on Mr. Gonzales. Officer Scholten was very clear in his answers. He
was very specific in his answers. He talked about why he held a flashlight at a
particular angle, that he does for officer safety reasons. He testified about having
undone the restraint on his holster, but not having withdrawn the gun from the
holster. He identified which side of the car Mr. Gonzales’s head was towards,
which side his feet were towards, and the motioning to get him out of the vehicle.
The Court observed Mr. Gonzales’s testimony to be somewhat rambling, to
be somewhat unclear. And the Court is cognizant that Mr. Gonzales has
forthrightly admitted that he was under the influence of methamphetamine at the
time. Presumably the law enforcement officer on duty that night was not under the
influence.
....
Based on what he saw, that Office [sic] Scholten saw, or at least got Mr.
Gonzales’s attention, and Mr. Gonzales opened the driver’s side door, and the
officer had to walk around the back side of the Chevy Blazer to get to Mr. Gonzales,
and observed that Mr. Gonzales was both twitching and sweating. I give weight to
that testimony based on Mr. Gonzales’s admission that he was under the influence
of methamphetamine. Those would be common symptoms of – that would be
observable there, even notwithstanding Mr. Gonzales says he doesn’t usually
display those symptoms; he tries to hide it. . . . .
And so he told Mr. Gonzales to put his hands behind his back. And he said
Mr. Gonzales made a very slight motion with his hands as if to put them behind the
back, and then bolted and ran for it. The officer caught up with him. Learned that
he was on probation. Learned that a probation officer had, only after catching Mr.
Gonzales, issued an agent’s warrant for Mr. Gonzales.[2] And then this led to the
discovery of the controlled substances that are the subject matter of the charges [in
this case].
1

The transcript of the suppression motion hearing held on June 1, 2017, will be identified as
“Supp. Tr.”. Officer Scholten testified that when he shined his flashlight into the Blazer, he saw
Gonzales lying on his side in a slight fetal position on the floorboard between the front seats and
the rear seat. (Supp. Tr., p.11, Ls.6-15.)
2

Officer Scholten testified that after Gonzales was detained (after he ran), he contacted Gonzales’s
probation officer who obtained an agent’s warrant; the officer arrested Gonzales on that agent’s
warrant and not for resisting or obstruction. (Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.4-16; p.20, L.22 – p.21, L.6.)
2

(Supp. Tr., p.38, L.11 – p.41, L.21.)
The state charged Gonzales with possession of methamphetamine and introducing or
attempting to introduce major contraband (methamphetamine) into a correctional facility. (R.,
pp.28-29.) Gonzales filed a motion to suppress, asserting that “the warrantless seizure by the
officers was unlawful and without legal justification, therefore in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1 § 17 of the Constitution of the
State of Idaho.” (R., pp.32-33.) The district court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the
initial detention was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, and, additionally, because
Gonzales fled when the officer attempted to conduct a pat-down search for weapons, the initial
seizure ended and the methamphetamine that was found on him when he was booked into jail (on
an agent’s warrant) was admissible. (R., pp.50-51; Supp. Tr., p.38, L.6 – p.45, L.2.)
Pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement, Gonzales entered guilty pleas to both charges, but
reserved his right to appeal the court’s decision on his motion to suppress. (R., pp.63-66.) The
district court sentenced Gonzales to seven years with three years fixed for possession of
methamphetamine, and five years with three years fixed for introducing or attempting to introduce
major contraband (methamphetamine) into a correctional facility, all concurrent. (R., pp.69-73.)
The court suspended the sentences for three years and placed Gonzalez on probation during that
time. (R., p.70.) Gonzales timely appealed. (R., pp.77-81.)

3

ISSUE
Gonzales states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gonzales’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Gonzales failed to show that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion?

4

ARGUMENT
Gonzales Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Gonzales’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine found on

him when he was booked into the county jail following his arrest on an agent’s warrant that was
issued after he was first detained and took flight from Officer Scholten. Gonzales challenges the
court’s ruling, arguing, as he did below, that the seizure of the methamphetamine “stemmed from”
an “unlawful seizure before his flight” and, as such, “the evidence is subject to the exclusionary
rule.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.)
In denying Gonzales’s motion, the district court concluded that Gonzales was “very briefly
detained” when the officer shined his flashlight on himself. (Supp. Tr., p.41, L.24 – p.42, L.6.)
Application of the correct law to the facts shows that Gonzales was not seized until after he took
flight; therefore, the court’s ruling should be upheld. 3 Additionally, even if Gonzales was briefly
seized by the officer shining his flashlight on himself, such seizure was supported by “reasonable
suspicion,” and even if it was not, his flight provided a new and attenuated reasonable suspicion
justifying his subsequent detention. (See Supp. Tr., p.42, L.9 – p.45, L.2); see Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that

3

The state is asserting a legal theory and analysis other than that utilized by the district court. A
correct ruling entered on an erroneous basis will be affirmed on the correct legal basis. See, e.g.,
State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332, 336, 325 P.3d 673, 677 (Ct. App. 2014).
5

are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts.” State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power
to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993,
997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate
court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial
evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

Gonzales Was Not Seized Until After He Took Flight
To constitute a seizure, the officer must, “by means of physical force or show of authority,”

in some way restrain an individual’s liberty. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486, 211 P.3d
91, 95 (2009) (citations omitted). Id. A seizure has two components. The first component – show
of authority – “requires words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement officer that would convey
to a reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement.”
Id. (citations omitted). The second component is that the suspect must actually submit to the show
of authority. Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 488-489, 211 P.3d at 97 (citing California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 626-629 (1991); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 590-591, 903 P.2d 752, 755-756
(Ct. App. 1995)).
The district court relied upon Officer Scholten’s testimony that when he saw Ms. Padel
walk away from him in the parking lot, “[h]e let her go and then went to the car and shined his
flashlight into this black Chevy Blazer. And his testimony was that he saw Mr. Gonzales lying on
the floor, head, side, feet on the floor.” (Supp. Tr., p.39, L.22 – p. 40, L.2; see id., p.10, L.17 –
p.6.) The fact that Officer Scholten illuminated the interior of the car with his flashlight did not
transform an otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure. The Idaho Supreme Court has held
6

the use of lights to illuminate an area can significantly enhance officer safety and does not
constitute a seizure of people in the illuminated area. State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 165, 107 P.3d
1214, 1216 (2004); see State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 322, 824 P.2d 894, 897 (Ct. App. 1991)
(“An officer’s use of a flashlight to illuminate the darkened interior of a vehicle” is not a search.)
Officer Scholten did not make any commands, display any weapon, or make physical contact with
Gonzales until he got out of the car; the officer testified:
A.
As he was exiting and he exited, I noticed that Mr. Gonzales was – appeared
nervous and twitching, and he was sweating. And then given all the circumstances
of Miss Padel’s previous mention of firearms involvement, and the circumstances
of Mr. Gonzales hiding late at night, dark hours in that parking lot, and he’s
sweating and twitching, I asked him if he would put his hands to the rear of his back
so I could pat him down. And that was just for weapons for safety.
Q.

All right. So, you patted him down for weapons. Did you find anything?

A.
I didn’t even make it to patting him down. At that point Mr. Gonzales took
off ruing [sic].
Q.
So, did he comply at all? Did he put his hands up and let you start the
search?
A.
He – he just began to make a motion of his hands to come to his back, and
then he took off running.
Q.

Okay. And did you pursue him?

A.

By foot, yes.
....

Q.

Were you able to apprehend him at some point?

A.

Yeah. Mr. Gonzales was caught and detained.

(Supp. Tr., p.12, L.4 - p.14, L.4; see id., p.17, L.19 p. p.18, L.4.)
Gonzales was not seized and his Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated until
Officer Scholten physically seized and detained him after Gonzales took flight. See Hodari D.,

7

499 U.S. at 629 (pursuit by police did not constitute a seizure and defendant was not seized until
he was tackled); Agundis, 127 Idaho at 590-591, 903 P.2d at 755-756. A mere show of authority,
where the subject does not submit, does not constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Agundis, 127 Idaho at 590-591, 903 P.2d at 755-756 (citing Hodari D., 499 U.S.at
625). Where the subject does not submit, the officer’s orders to stop do not constitute a seizure
and do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. Because Officer Scholten did nothing to order
Gonzales out of the car, and because Gonzales did not submit to the first and only command the
officer gave him prior to taking flight – to put his hands behind his back – Gonzales was not seized
until Officer Scholten subsequently caught him after he ran away. At that time, Officer Scholten
clearly had reasonable suspicion to detain Gonzales – he was found hiding on the back seat car
floorboard late at night in a dark area of a parking lot, he appeared nervous, he was twitching and
sweating, and he attempted to flee. 4
Because Gonzales was not “seized” by Officer Scholten prior to taking flight, and because
the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Gonzales after he took flight, the district
court correctly denied Gonzales’s motion to suppress, although on a different legal theory than
adopted by the court. See State v. White, 102 Idaho 924, 925, 644 P.2d 318, 319 (1982) (“This
Court has held that where a ruling is correct it is immaterial that the reason given by the trial court
for admitting the evidence may have been incorrect.”). The district court’s denial of Gonzales’s
suppression motion should be affirmed on this alternate ground.

4

In should be recalled that, while detaining Gonzales, Officer Scholten contacted Gonzales’s
probation officer who prepared an agent’s warrant, and Officer Scholten arrested Gonzales on that
warrant. (Supp. Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.6.)
8

D.

Even If Gonzales Was Initially Detained When The Officer Shined His Flashlight On
Himself, Gonzales Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Determination
That The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Him
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. An investigatory seizure “is permissible
if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88
P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). “The justification for an investigative detention is evaluated
upon the totality of the circumstances then known to the officer.” Id.
Evidence sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion is “less than that necessary to
establish probable cause” but requires “more than a mere hunch.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). Reasonable suspicion “does not require a belief that any specific
criminal activity is afoot to justify an investigative detention; instead, all that is required is a
showing of objective and specific articulable facts giving reason to believe that the individual has
been or is about to be involved in some criminal activity.” State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609,
615, 329 P.3d 391, 397 (Ct. App. 2014) (emphasis original). In addition, “innocent acts, when
considered together, can be sufficiently suspicious so as to justify an investigative detention.”
State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 925, 367 P.3d 1231, 1237 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989)).
Applying those standards here, the district court correctly concluded that, “to the extent
Mr. Gonzales was seized” when Officer Scholten shined his flashlight on Gonzales and then

9

himself, such seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion. (See Supp. Tr., p.41, L.22 – p.43,
L.22.) The court based its decision on the following facts: 5
1. At about 1:45 or 1:50 a.m. on March 3, 2017, Officer Scholten was patrolling
the parking lot “shared between the businesses of Shari’s restaurant and La
Quinta Motel.” (Supp. Tr., p.38, Ls.11-19.)
2. The officer watched Arielle Padel, whom he recognized as a person of interest
from investigations of vehicle and/or firearm thefts, get out of a Chevy Blazer
that was parked between the La Quinta Motel and Sheri’s restaurant in a “very
darkened part of the parking lot.” (Supp. Tr., p.38, L.15 – p.39, L.18.)
3. Officer Scholten tried to contact Ms. Padel, but she “just walked away and was
not interested in talking to the peace officer.” 6 (Supp. Tr., p.39, Ls.18-24.)
4. It is a reasonable inference that, because the two businesses were open in the
nighttime, their entrances were well-lighted. Therefore, “one would think that
one would park either at Shari’s or La Quinta and – rather than in the dark part
of a parking lot between those two if they were actually going to utilize those
businesses.” (Supp. Tr., p.39, Ls.3-9.)
5. Officer Scholten walked to the Chevy Blazer and, upon shining his flashlight
into it, he “saw Mr. Gonzales lying on the floor, head, side, feet on the floor[,]”

5

In its concluding remarks, the district court noted Officer Scholten’s testimony that, after he got
Gonzales’s attention, “Mr. Gonzales opened the driver’s side door, and the officer had to walk
around the back side of the Chevy Blazer to get to Mr. Gonzales, and observed that Mr. Gonzales
was both twitching and sweating[,]” common symptoms of methamphetamine use. (Supp. Tr.,
p.41, Ls.1-12.) The court found that Gonzales “was very briefly detained, and in the sense that
when [the] officer signed [sic] the flashlight in on Mr. Gonzales and then indicated that he was
shining it on himself to say he was a law enforcement officer, and may have indicated a need for
Mr. Gonzales to get out of the vehicle, that a reasonable person could have viewed that as being
detained. The Court makes a finding that this was very brief.” (Supp. Tr., p.41, L.24 – p.42, L.6.)
The court later qualified its finding, stating, “to the extent Mr. Gonzales was seized, it was a very
brief seizure . . . .” (Supp. Tr., p.43, Ls.18-22.) Because the court found that, to the extent
Gonzales was detained when the officer “indicated a need for [him] to get out of the vehicle,” the
subsequent observations by the officer are not relevant to whether he had reasonable suspicion for
the initial seizure.
6

Officer Scholten parked about 20 feet from Ms. Padel’s Chevy Blazer, and when he attempted
to talk to her, she walked away from her vehicle and headed towards the front doors of the La
Quinta Motel. (Supp. Tr., p.9, L.11 – p.10, L.1.)
10

“crouched down in the backseat of the vehicle in this darkened area of the
parking lot[.]” 7 (Supp. Tr., p.39, L.24 – p.40, L.2; p.42, Ls.23-25.)
Based on the above factors, the district court correctly concluded that Officer Scholten had
reasonable suspicion to detain Gonzales. Gonzales was obviously hiding from Officer Scholten
by lying on his side in a semi-fetal position on the floorboard 8 between the front and back seats
of a small Chevy Blazer after 1:00 a.m. in a dark part of the parking lot.
Although the past theft investigations and avoidance behavior of Ms. Padel, considered
alone, were insufficient to justify Gonzales’s initial detention, those factors must be considered as
part of the totality of circumstances known to Officer Scholten at the time of the initial seizure.
See State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992). Based on all the
circumstances, as set forth above, Officer Scholten had reasonable suspicion that Gonzales was,
or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223;
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
Gonzales has failed to show error in the district court’s determination that Officer Scholten
had reasonable suspicion to initially detain him.

7

Officer Scholten testified that Gonzales was on the floorboard of the back seat of the smallersized SUV, lying on his side in a “crunched” or “slight fetal” position. (Supp. Tr., p.11, Ls.6-15.)
8

Gonzales testified he was seated in the back seat, not on the floorboard of the back seat, and
there was no way he could have been on the floorboard. (Supp. Tr., p.30, L.24 – p.31, L.4.) The
district court found Officer Scholten’s testimony credible, and that the testimony of Gonzales, who
admitted being under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the offense, was not
credible. (Supp. Tr., p.40, Ls.3-22.)
11

E.

Gonzales Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Determination That, Even
If The Initial Seizure Was Illegal, Gonzales’s Flight Provided New Reasonable Suspicion
To Seize Him – Attenuated From The Initial Seizure
1. Introduction
After ruling that Officer Scholten had reasonable suspicion to initially detain Gonzales, the

district court further ruled that Gonzales’s subsequent flight gave Officer Scholten a new basis for
seizing him, stating:
And so the Court views the flight as a further grounds [sic] for further
detention, which, in fact, he was quite detained when he’s run down and arrested.
Also, the Court would find that there is, in fact, reasonable – or excuse me
– probable cause that obstructing and delaying an officer had been committed when
Mr. Gonzales ran for it under these circumstances.
(Supp. Tr., p.44, Ls.17-23.)
Although the court’s above ruling did not expressly state that Gonzales’s flight from
Officer Scholten served to attenuate any taint that may have flowed from an allegedly illegal initial
seizure, it could have correctly done so. This Court should affirm the denial of Gonzales’s
suppression motion on that alternative basis. See State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 388, 234 P.3d
707, 712 (2010) (affirming denial of motion on correct theory, one not reached by trial court);
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (if trial court reaches the correct
result by erroneous theory, appellate court will affirm upon the correct theory).

2. Officer Scholten Had Reasonable Suspicion To Seize Gonzales After He Took Flight
Officer Scholten’s post-flight seizure of Gonzales was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Fleeing from the police can create reasonable suspicion: “Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—
is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly
suggestive of such.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). The Idaho Supreme Court

12

has accordingly found reasonable suspicion and a justified detention in a case strikingly similar to
this one:
In this case, the facts available to the officer were that he saw Mr. Padilla walking
down an alley at about 2:00 a.m.; that he turned on his car’s headlights and drove
to a place near Mr. Padilla, positioned the car so that Mr. Padilla could clearly see
that it was a marked police car, and stopped; and that, as he began getting out of
the car, Mr. Padilla fled. Mr. Padilla did not merely run away down the sidewalk,
alley, or street when the officer began getting out of the police car. He ran between
two houses and jumped over a fence. Considering the totality of the facts available
to the officers, they had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe criminal
activity may be afoot and could seize Mr. Padilla in order to investigate their
suspicion.
Padilla v. State, 161 Idaho 624, 627, 389 P.3d 169, 172 (2016). The Padilla Court concluded that
“the seizure of Mr. Padilla did not violate his rights under the Constitution of the United States.”
Id. Here too, the totality of the facts available to the officer – the late hour, dark area, Ms. Padel’s
avoidance of contact, Gonzales’s hiding on the floorboard of the vehicle, his twitching and
nervousness, and his flight – provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to seize Gonzales after
he ran.

3. Gonzales’s “Continuing Seizure” Argument Is Unsupported By Law
Gonzales does not argue that the district court erred in determining that his flight provided
Officer Scholten with probable cause (much less reasonable suspicion) to seize him. (See
Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-13.) Instead, Gonzales employs a “but for” argument contending that
because his initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion, everything that transpired
subsequently – his flight, the agent’s warrant, and the seizure of methamphetamine at the county
jail – were all the result of the illegal and continuous initial seizure that was merely “temporarily
‘terminated’” by his flight.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.13 (“Although Mr. Gonzales temporarily

‘terminated’ the seizure by fleeing, the seizure continued once he was detained and arrested by
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Officer Scholten.”).)

Therefore, Gonzales asserts, the methamphetamine should have been

suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree, stemming from his original, allegedly illegal
detention. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11, 13.)
Gonzales’s argument that his initial seizure continued to the time the methamphetamine
was found on him at the county jail is misplaced. See State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 436-437,
146 P.3d 697, 702-703 (Ct. App. 2006) (When after being briefly detained, defendant disobeyed
officer’s order to remain seated and fled, defendant was no longer the subject of an unlawful
detention, and the chase by the officer did not constitute a new seizure until defendant was tackled
by officer, and the methamphetamine discarded by defendant and dropped by him while fleeing
was not the fruit of a poisonous tree.); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (When
defendant disobeyed law enforcement’s order to stop and fled, defendant was not seized until he
was tackled, and the cocaine abandoned by him while he was running was not the fruit of a
seizure.). Apart from the “abandonment” principle, the Zuniga and Hodari D. decisions hold that
a suspect who takes flight is not being detained. Moreover, Zuniga made it clear that, where there
is an initial detention, followed by a suspect’s flight and re-capture, there have been two separate
detentions or seizures of the suspect. Zuniga, 143 Idaho at 437, 146 P.3d at 703 (“[W]e hold that
when Zuniga disobeyed Detective Lathrop’s order to remain seated and fled from the scene, he
was no longer the subject of an unlawful detention. The chase by Detective Lathrop did not
constitute a new seizure under Hodari D., until Zuniga was tackled by Lathrop.”).
Gonzales’s argument that his initial seizure “continued” when he took flight and was
caught by Officer Scholten is unsupported in law. (See Appellant’s Brief, p.13); see
State
- -also
--- - -v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not supported
by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered . . . .”).
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4. Attenuation
Not all evidence obtained by police after an unconstitutional action is suppressible, even if
it would not have been obtained but for the unconstitutional action:
“We need not hold that all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because
it would not have come to light but for illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more
apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint.’”
State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249, 787 P.2d 231, 235 (1990) (quoting Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)); see
also -State
- --- - -v.
- -Schrecengost,
- - - - - - - - 134 Idaho 547, 549, 6 P.3d 403,
405 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether evidence has been obtained by exploiting an illegality is determined
by looking at three factors: 1) the temporal proximity of the illegal police conduct and the
acquisition of the evidence; 2) whether there are intervening circumstances between the illegal
police conduct and the acquisition of the evidence; and 3) whether the purposes and flagrancy of
the official misconduct “satisf[y] the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule . . . .” Bainbridge,
117 Idaho at 250, 787 P.2d at 236. In considering these factors, “no single fact is dispositive.”
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975).
In United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit cited the
Supreme Court’s three-factor attenuation test and correctly noted that: “In the final analysis,
however, the question is still whether the evidence came from ‘the exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’” (Citing Brown,
422 U.S. 590, and quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). “Typically, the
intervening circumstance which dissipates the taint involves a voluntary act by the defendant, such
as the voluntary confession or consent to search given after an illegal search or seizure.” Green,
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111 F.3d at 522. Stated another way, the taint is dissipated once there is a voluntary act by the
defendant regardless of the timing of the actual discovery of evidence. See id.
Although there is temporal proximity in this case, the other two factors show that even if
Gonzales’s appellate argument – that the district court erred in finding that Officer Scholten had
reasonable suspicion for the initial detention – is accepted, it would not lead to suppression of the
evidence later seized. The intervening circumstance in this case was Gonzales’s voluntary flight. 9
Gonzales freely and voluntarily decided to run when Officer Scholten merely asked him to “face
away and put his hands behind his back” so he could conduct a pat-down for weapons. (Supp. Tr.,
p.19, L.21 – p.20, L.6.) Therefore, the second Brown factor weighs against Gonzales. The third
factor, whether the purposes and flagrancy of the official misconduct “satisf[y] the deterrent
rationale of the exclusionary rule,” Bainbridge, 117 Idaho at 250, 787 P.2d at 236, also weighs
against Gonzales, as the appellate record bears no hint of an improper purpose or flagrancy in

9

In United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1430–31 (8th Cir. 1995), the Eighth Circuit explained
that several courts have found that “flight” alone can attenuate an initial illegal seizure:
. . . [T]he government notes that several courts consider resistance to even
an illegal arrest to be grounds for a second, legitimate arrest. See United States v.
Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that where the nexus between
the original arrest and search had been attenuated by the defendant’s attempt to flee,
the fruits of the search were not attributable to the original arrest) . . .; United States
v. Garcia, 516 F.2d 318, 319–20 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that neither illegal conduct
on the part of the police nor the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest
excluded defendant’s flight from police from consideration as the basis for a lawful
arrest); United States v. Waupekenay, 973 F.2d 1533, 1538 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
that evidence of a separate, independent crime initiated against police officers in
their presence after an illegal entry or arrest will not be suppressed under the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1019 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding that despite a close causal nexus between an allegedly illegal arrest and
the defendant’s response, that response provided probable cause for a second,
lawful arrest) . . . [“W]e now hold that a defendant’s response to even an invalid
arrest or Terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest.”
16

Officer Scholten’s attempt to conduct a Terry stop of Gonzales in order to ask him why he was
hiding on the floorboard in the back seat of a small SUV in a darkened area so late at night.
Under the three-part attenuation test of Brown, even if the initial seizure of Gonzales was
illegal, the second seizure after he took flight was supported by reasonable suspicion (at least) and
was not tainted by any illegality of the first seizure. Thus, on this alternative basis, Gonzales’s
argument fails.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Gonzales’s convictions and sentences.
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2018.
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